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Abstract 
People frequently continue to use inaccurate information in their reasoning even after a credible 
retraction has been presented. This phenomenon is often referred to as the continued influence 
effect of misinformation. The repetition of the original misconception within a retraction could 
contribute to this phenomenon, as it could inadvertently make the “myth” more familiar—and 
familiar information is more likely to be accepted as true. From a dual-process perspective, 
familiarity-based acceptance of myths is most likely to occur in the absence of strategic memory 
processes. We thus examined factors known to affect whether strategic memory processes can be 
utilized. Participants rated their belief in various statements of unclear veracity, and facts were 
subsequently affirmed and myths were retracted. Participants then re-rated their belief either 
immediately or after a delay. We compared groups of young and older participants, and we 
manipulated the amount of detail presented in the affirmative/corrective explanations, as well as 
the retention interval between encoding and a retrieval attempt. We found that (1) a greater level 
of explanatory detail promoted more sustained belief change, and (2) fact affirmations promoted 
more sustained belief change in comparison to myth retractions over the course of one week (but 
not over three weeks), particularly for older adults. This supports the notion that familiarity is 
indeed a driver of continued influence effects. 
 
 
Keywords: misinformation; continued influence effect; belief updating; familiarity backfire 
effect; older adults; dual-process models of memory.  
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The Role of Familiarity in Correcting Inaccurate Information 
Every day we process an extraordinary amount of information, and it is often up to the 
individual to discern fact from fiction. A proportion of this information is inevitably inaccurate 
and deserves to be corrected after initial encoding. In order to maintain an accurate and up-to-
date representation of the world, ideally we would disregard invalidated information. However, 
we are far from perfect at performing this task, as corrected misinformation often continues to 
influence memory and reasoning—this persistence is termed the continued influence effect of 
misinformation (cf. Ecker, Lewandowsky, Swire, & Chang, 2011;  Johnson & Seifert, 1994). 
With “fake news” fast becoming a global issue, and with the increased spread of misinformation 
over social media, the ability to effectively correct misinformation has never been more 
important (Connolly et al., 2016; Lavoipierre, 2017). From relatively benign misconceptions 
such as “ostriches hide their heads in the sand” to more malignant misinformation such as “the 
MMR vaccine causes autism” (Poland & Spier, 2010), studies have consistently observed a 
continued influence effect. In other words, simply stating that information is incorrect is often 
ineffective, with simple retractions typically only halving the number of references to a critical 
piece of misinformation relative to a no-retraction control condition (see Lewandowsky, Ecker, 
Seifert, Schwarz, & J. Cook, 2012, for a review). Part of the reason why corrections are often 
ineffective may arise because corrections typically repeat the misinformation, thereby making it 
more familiar. The present paper investigates whether the continued influence effect is at least 
partially familiarity-driven, and how beliefs change over time after a credible correction has been 
presented. 
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The Illusory Truth Effect 
The illusory truth effect occurs when increased familiarity gives rise to the illusion that 
information is valid and inadvertently increases an individual’s belief (Begg, Anas, & Farinacci, 
1992; Dechene, Stahl, Hansen, & Wanke, 2010; Wang, Brashier, Wing, Marsh, & Cabeza, 
2016). For example, DiFonzo, Beckstead, Stupak, and Walders (2016) presented participants 
with rumors about campus life, such as a professor giving a student good grades to keep them 
quiet about the professor’s plagiarism. DiFonzo and colleagues varied the number of 
presentations (from 0-9 times) and found that belief in the statements was logarithmically related 
to the number of repetitions, such that belief increased with each repetition (albeit in diminishing 
amounts). In line with this, a recent popular news survey found that 75 % of people assumed 
fake headlines to be true if they were familiar (Silverman, 2016). 
The illusory truth effect could be problematic when attempting to correct misinformation, 
as a correction often repeats the original claim. For example, truthfully stating that playing 
Mozart to your child will not boost its IQ mentions the two concepts of “Mozart” and “increased 
IQ”, thereby making the link between the concepts more familiar even though the statement 
seeks to dispel the Mozart-IQ myth. This inadvertent increase in familiarity may reduce the 
effectiveness of a correction and may thus contribute to the continued influence effect of 
misinformation.  
Strategic and Automatic Memory Processes 
The potential familiarity-related difficulties that arise during the correction of 
misinformation may be explained from a dual-processing perspective. Dual-process theories of 
memory assume a dichotomy between automatic memory processes, which include familiarity, 
and strategic memory processes such as recollection and output monitoring (cf. Brown & 
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Warburton, 2006; Diana, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2007; Rugg & Curran, 2007; Yonelinas, 
2002; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 2012; Zimmer & Ecker, 2010). Familiarity is thought to be a fast, 
context-free automatic process that allows for the rapid recognition of previously encountered 
information. Recollection, by contrast, is a slower process thought to allow for the retrieval of 
contextual details, such as the information’s source, its spatiotemporal encoding context, or its 
veracity. In the case of corrected misinformation, it is often assumed that a “negation tag” is 
linked to the original statement, for example, “playing Mozart to your child will boost its IQ—
NOT TRUE” (Gilbert, Krull, & Malone, 1990). Thus, a corrected statement may require strategic 
memory processes for veracity to be successfully retrieved, as the negation tag is at risk of being 
lost if only automatic processes are employed, which may however identify the statement (e.g., 
the Mozart-IQ link) as familiar.  
Regardless of whether statements are correct or have been invalidated, existing memory 
representations will be activated in response to cues via automatic retrieval to the extent that the 
information is familiar (cf. Ayers & Reder, 1998). To avoid reliance on familiar but invalid 
information, strategic memory processes are required to act as a filter of automatically retrieved 
memory output. However, strategic memory processes take effort and often fail (e.g., Herron & 
Rugg, 2003), and thus people can rely upon invalid but automatically retrieved information in 
their judgments (Ecker et al., 2011; Koutstaal & Schacter, 1997; Reyna & Lloyd, 1997; 
Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001). A post-correction misinformation effect is 
therefore likely to occur when misinformation has been automatically activated but strategic 
memory processes have failed (Ecker, Lewandowsky, & Tang, 2010). Familiarity can thus 
hinder the remediating effect of a correction when the repetition of misinformation in the course 
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of its correction boosts an invalid item’s familiarity such that it outweighs the correction’s 
strategic-retrieval dependent corrective effect. 
The Familiarity Backfire Effect  
Some reports suggest that the familiarity boost associated with a correction can be so 
detrimental that it causes a familiarity backfire effect, such that a correction can ironically 
increase an individual’s belief in the very misconception the correction is aiming to rectify (J. 
Cook & Lewandowsky, 2011; Lewandowsky et al., 2012).1 An unpublished manuscript by 
Skurnik, Yoon, and Schwarz (2007; as cited in Schwarz, Sanna, Skurnik, & Yoon, 2007), is 
frequently cited when discussing the familiarity backfire effect (e.g., Berinsky, 2015; J. Cook, 
Bedford, & Mandia, 2014; Gemberling & Cramer, 2014; Lilienfeld, Marshall, Todd, & Shane, 
2015; Peter & Koch, 2016; Schultz, 2012). Skurnik et al. presented participants with a flyer 
presenting a number of flu-vaccine related claims. The flyer was either presented in a “myths vs. 
facts” format, which affirmed the factual statements and refuted the incorrect, or the flyer only 
affirmed the facts but did not mention the myths (or, in a control condition, there was no flyer at 
all). Immediately after participants read the “myth vs. facts” flyer, they were able to reliably 
distinguish between myths and facts, yet after a delay of 30 minutes, participants misidentified 
15% of the myths as facts (compared to only 2 % of the facts being classified as false). Also, 
after a 30-minute delay, participants in the myths vs. facts condition had less favorable attitudes 
towards the vaccine than participants who had never seen the flyer at all.  
                                                          
1 The term familiarity backfire effect has been used somewhat inconsistently. The term is 
sometimes used simply when myths are misremembered as facts, without a control condition or 
baseline comparison (cf. Peter & Koch, 2016). However, we argue it should only pertain to cases 
where a correction inadvertently increases myth belief relative to a no-correction or pre-
correction baseline. Our definition is in accordance with other backfire effects such as the 
worldview backfire effect (Lewandowsky et al., 2012). 
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Skurnik et al.’s (2007) finding that people had a less favorable attitude towards vaccines 
than those who did not view the flyer may reflect a familiarity backfire effect. However, given 
that Skurnik et al. only focused upon one contentious issue, there is an alternative explanation—
namely a worldview backfire effect. This backfire effect ensues when a correction challenges a 
person’s belief system and the person becomes motivated to defend their worldview, resulting in 
an increased belief in the inaccurate information, relative to a situation where the correction was 
never presented (Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Trevors, Muis, Pekrun, Sinatra, & Winne, 2016). 
This effect is a known risk when debating contentious issues and can contribute to belief 
polarization (Hart & Nisbet, 2012; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). Nyhan and colleagues (Nyhan, 
Reifler, Richey, & Freed, 2014; Nyhan & Reifler, 2015) recently demonstrated that corrections 
of vaccine-related misconceptions can backfire in people concerned about vaccination safety 
and/or opposed to vaccinations. Thus, when attempting to measure the effects of familiarity, it 
would be beneficial to not exclusively focus upon politicized information (e.g., Berinsky, 2015) 
or contentious topics such as vaccination to avoid confounding the effects of familiarity and 
worldview. 
Regarding the misidentification of myths as facts in the Skurnik et al. (2007) study, 
results from the comparison between the “myths vs. facts” condition and the no-flyer control 
condition are not available, so it is unclear whether myth belief was greater after presenting 
corrections than after not presenting any information at all. However, misremembering myths as 
facts could in general reflect an interesting hurdle in belief updating, even if there is no “true” 
backfire effect. Considering the benefits of clear communication, in particular in the context of 
myth debunking, it is important to better understand the factors that may contribute to this 
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differential forgetting of myths relative to facts (or more precisely, differential forgetting 
regarding the veracity of myths relative to facts).  
Theoretically, if people are presented with explanations affirming facts or refuting myths, 
belief in facts may be sustained over time, whereas myth items appear to be “forgotten”, simply 
because automatic and strategic memory processes operate in concert for facts but stand in 
opposition for myths (cf. Brainerd & Reyna, 2008; Jacoby, 1991; Toth, 1996). For fact items, 
regardless of whether automatic processes or strategic memory processes are employed, both 
would lead a participant to conclude that the item is true. By contrast, if a participant is unable to 
correctly recall the correction of a myth due to the forgetting that primarily affects strategic 
memory processes, the familiarity of the myth—boosted by its repetition during the correction—
could lead to the myth being inaccurately accepted as true.  
Factors Likely to Influence the Correction of Information: Detail, Time, and Age 
It follows from the dual-process notion that the relative impact of familiarity on 
corrections could potentially be influenced by factors that are known to affect strategic memory 
processes, including (1) the amount of detail presented in the corrective explanation, (2) the 
retention interval between encoding and a retrieval attempt, and (3) the age of the participant.  
Regarding the correction’s level of detail, providing sufficiently detailed explanations as 
to why a piece of misinformation is false—in other words, providing a detailed refutation rather 
than a sparse “that-is-not-true” retraction (cf. Guzzetti, 2000)—might counteract familiarity’s 
influence. For example, where a simple retraction would merely state that “listening to Mozart 
will not boost your child’s IQ”, a detailed refutation would also explain why (e.g., by 
highlighting that scientific findings were misrepresented in a popular yet unscientific book, and 
that the original study neither tested infants nor measured IQ; Campbell, 1997; Pietschnig, 
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Voracek, & Formann, 2010; Rauscher, Shaw, & Ky, 1993). Thus, refutations directly address the 
misconception and explain the reasons why the misinformation is false and/or where the 
misconception originated. Refutations have been found to promote belief change over long 
periods of time (Diakidoy, Mouskounti, Fella, & Ioannides, 2016; Guzzetti, Snyder, Glass, & 
Gamas, 1993); it is assumed that refutations are more effective than retractions because they 
encourage the detection of inconsistencies between a person’s inaccurate beliefs and the 
corrective information, and because they provide richer informational detail that can later 
support recollection of the correction (Guzetti, 2000). 
Regarding the retention interval, failure of strategic processes is particularly likely when 
there is some delay between encoding and attempted retrieval, as strategic recollection of details 
diminishes with time, whereas familiarity stays relatively constant (Knowlton & Squire, 1995). 
Thus, false acceptance of myths based on their familiarity seems particular likely at longer 
retention intervals. 
Regarding age, older adults have less efficient strategic memory processes than young 
adults, whereas automatic processing such as familiarity-detection remains relatively age-
invariant (e.g., Prull, Dawes, Martin, Rosenberg, & Light, 2006). In particular, older adults seem 
to become less efficient at binding item and context information (Naveh-Benjamin, 2000); 
therefore, the mnemonic link between a statement and its veracity could be weaker in older 
adults. This is in line with the finding that source memory—memory for where or how 
information was acquired—is particularly susceptible to the effects of ageing (e.g., Glisky, 
Rubin, & Davidson, 2001). Consistent with this notion, Skurnik, Yoon, Park, and Schwarz 
(2005) found that older adults were particularly likely to misremember myths as facts after 
repeated retractions (compared to single retractions) after a three-day retention interval (but not 
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after 30-minutes, and not in younger adults as per the Skurnik et al. 2007 study). However, it is 
difficult to draw firm conclusions from the Skurnik et al. (2005) study for several reasons: (i) 
there was no control group where corrections were not presented at all or pre-manipulation belief 
ratings were measured; (ii) no cognitive screening task was given to participants, potentially 
reducing the generalizability of findings; and (iii) health claims were used that were arbitrarily 
labeled as valid or invalid without explanation, even though all claims were actually true—thus 
some corrections were misleading, and distrust in the corrections may have contributed to the 
results, as it is well established that source credibility is an influential factor in the 
persuasiveness of messages (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Guillory & Geraci, 2013). 
In summary, factors such as the correction’s level of explanatory detail, retention 
interval, and participant age are likely to play a role in determining the success of a correction, 
but their specific importance is unclear and findings have been inconsistent. By manipulating and 
comparing these factors, the present research aimed to clarify if and under what conditions 
familiarity is most problematic. Experiment 1 tested young adults, Experiment 2 tested older 
adults. 
Experiment 1 
This study presented an undergraduate population with both incorrect and correct claims 
(i.e., myths and facts), then corrected the false claims in a way that boosted their familiarity. To 
this end, participants were presented with a range of statements of unclear veracity that were 
subsequently labeled as true or false. People’s belief in the statements was measured both before 
the true/false explanation and in a post-manipulation test phase to yield a measure of belief 
change. To avoid the problems associated with posttest-only designs (Morris, 2008), we used a 
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pretest-posttest design so that each individual could be used as their own control (Hunter & 
Schmidt, 2004). 
Level of explanatory detail and study-test retention interval were manipulated to identify 
the parameters of corrections that promote successful discounting of misinformation. The 
experiment used a 2 × 2 × 3 within-between design, with within-subjects factors type of item 
(myth vs. fact) and type of explanation (the veracity of each statement was explained either 
briefly or in some detail), and the between-subjects factor retention interval (immediate, 30-
minute, or one-week). In some studies, continued influence effects were found primarily in more 
indirect measures of belief that require participants to use the misinformation in reasoning (cf. 
Johnson & Seifert, 1994). Therefore, inference questions were also administered at test, serving 
as a more indirect measure of belief that could help avoid issues related to social desirability.  
We hypothesized that (1) detailed explanations would lead to stronger belief change than 
brief explanations for both myths and facts, and (2) belief change would be more sustained over 
time after fact affirmation compared to myth retraction, as false familiarity-based acceptance of 
myths would seem particular likely at longer retention intervals. We did not expect a backfire 
effect, as there are no clear demonstrations of a true familiarity backfire effect in the peer-
reviewed literature. However, we hypothesized that one was theoretically most likely to occur 
with a brief retraction after a one-week delay. 
Method 
Participants. A power analysis (conducted with GPower3; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & 
Buchner, 2007) suggested that 78 participants were required in order to detect a small-to-medium 
effect (effect size f = .15) with α = .05, 1 – β = .80, and a moderate correlation between repeated 
measures of r = .50. Participants were 100 undergraduate students from the University of 
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Western Australia who volunteered after reading an ethically-approved information sheet. They 
received course credit for participation. Two participants did not complete the study, and five 
participants over the age of 30 were excluded as age outliers. This conformed to the age split of 
prior research (Skurnik et al., 2005) as well as the outlier labeling rule threshold (i.e., 2.2 times 
the interquartile range above the third quartile [Hoaglin & Iglewicz, 1987]), which was 29.8 
years of age. The final pool included N = 93 participants, with 19 males and 74 females between 
16-28 years of age, and a mean age of M = 19.11 (SD = 2.53). 
Stimuli. There were 20 myths and 20 facts, each with a corresponding brief explanation, 
a detailed explanation, and two inference questions. An example myth / fact and the 
corresponding explanations and example inference questions are given in Table 1 (see 
Supplement A for the complete list of items, explanations, and inference questions). Brief 
explanations simply stated whether the item was a myth or a fact with no further clarification. 
They explicitly repeated the initial statement twice (once in the original and once in a negated 
format if the item was a myth). Thus participants encountered the initial statement three times 
altogether: once when being initially rated, and twice in the explanation. Detailed explanations 
also provided the myth/fact label but in addition included three or four sentences of further 
information; myth retractions did not provide a causal alternative to the myth but rather 
explained why the myth was wrong and/or where it originated from. Detailed explanations 
explicitly repeated the initial statement only once, but elements of the statement were repeated in 
the additional information.  
Inference questions were rated on an 11-point scale, with the specific scale-value range 
dependent on the item; for example, some items were rated on a 0-10 scale, others were rated on 
a 0-20 % scale with 2 % increments.  
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Two pilot studies were conducted to select stimuli from a list of 80 items (55 myths and 
25 facts) that was initially compiled by selecting various items from websites such as New 
Scientist, Scientific American, and myth busting programs such as QI. Each item was researched 
to the best of our ability, and where possible evidence from the peer-reviewed literature was 
sought out. The aim of the first pilot study was to select a pool of items that were common and 
mid-range believable, to allow for either reduction or increase in belief following retractions or 
affirmations, respectively. The second pilot study was run to ensure that the inference questions 
were in fact indirect measures of belief (i.e., that they correlated with the associated explicit 
belief measures; e.g., to ensure the inference question ‘What percentage of lies can FBI 
detectives catch just by looking at physical tells’ is sufficiently measuring an individual’s belief 
that it is possible for liars to give themselves away by physical tells).  
Pilot Study 1. The aim of the first pilot study was to select an item pool of myths that 
were common and at least mid-range believable. Thirty-one undergraduate students from the 
University of Western Australia took part. Participants indicated for 55 myth and 20 fact items 
(1) if they had heard of the item before (i.e., familiarity) and (2) the extent to which they 
believed each item (i.e., believability). Familiarity was measured on a five point scale ranging 
from “Definitely not heard before” to “Definitely heard before”. Myths were removed from the 
stimulus set if they scored below a mean of 3.5 out of 5. Believability was measured on a 1-10 
scale ranging from “Not at all believable” to “Very much so”. Myths were removed from the 
stimulus set if they scored below a mean of 4.5; one additional item with a mean greater than 9.0 
was also removed (to avoid any ceiling effects reducing the likelihood of a familiarity backfire 
effect).  
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After Pilot Study 1, there were 37 myths remaining. The mean familiarity score of the 
myths was M = 4.46 out of 5 (SD = .35). The mean familiarity rating of the facts was M = 3.39 
(SD = 1.04). The believability mean for the myths was M = 6.24 (SD = 1.12) and the mean for 
the facts was M = 5.34 (SD = 1.89).  Pre-manipulation familiarity and belief ratings were 
positively correlated, r = .79, showing that the more familiar items were believed more strongly.  
Pilot Study 2. The second pilot study was run to ensure that the inference questions were 
in fact an indirect measure of belief in the initial claims. Participants were 100 individuals who 
volunteered via Crowdflower (http://www.crowdflower.com), a crowdsourcing website where 
contributors perform tasks and are paid for their services. Participants were paid $1.80. Five fact 
items were added to the set after Pilot Study 1 in order to boost their number in comparison to 
myths. Participants rated how much they believed in the 38 myths and 25 facts, and responded to 
two corresponding inference questions per claim.  
 Participants were excluded if they reported their English skills to be only “fair” (0 on a 
4-point scale ranging from “fair” to “native speaker”; 5 individuals), if they took less than 15 
minutes to complete the task (23 individuals) or more than 85 minutes (3 individuals; mean 
completion time was M = 34.88 minutes, SD = 35.36 minutes). The data were also screened for 
inconsistent response patterns suggestive of participants not paying attention, but no participants 
were excluded. A total of N = 75 participants were included in the analysis. Spearman’s 
correlations were calculated for each item and the two corresponding inference questions. Items 
were excluded from the stimulus set if both inference questions did not significantly correlate 
with belief in the corresponding claim (with p < .05; r ranging from .23 – .81); this resulted in 
exclusion of 19 items—14 myths and 5 facts—leaving 24 myths and 20 facts.  
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In a final step, the four remaining myths with the lowest belief ratings and correlations 
between inference questions and belief ratings were removed. The final stimulus set thus 
comprised 20 myths and 20 facts, each with two corresponding inference questions. 
Procedure. Participants were seated individually in testing booths and the experiment 
was administered by Qualtrics survey software. Participants were presented the 40 items in 
randomized order, and they indicated on a 0-10 scale the extent to which they believed each item 
using a computer mouse. Directly after each item was rated, participants received either a brief 
or a detailed explanation, which were randomly counter-balanced. In the immediate test 
condition (i.e., no retention interval), the test phase began immediately after all items had been 
rated and retracted or affirmed. The test phase involved a block of 80 inference questions (two 
per item) in random order, followed by a block of 40 direct belief ratings in random order. 
Participants in the 30-minute retention interval group completed an unrelated filler task before 
the test, and participants in the one-week group completed the test phase a week later—this test 
was administered in an online format in order to keep participation rates high. The test phase 
was identical regardless of retention interval.
Results  
Belief ratings. Both pre-manipulation facts and myths attracted mid-range initial belief 
ratings, as expected, Mfacts = 5.69, SDfacts = .79; Mmyths = 6.03, SDmyths = .97. A within-subjects 
ANOVA comparing the pre-manipulation fact and myth belief ratings showed that participants 
initially believed the myths slightly more than the facts, F(1,92) = 9.61; p = .003; MSE = .58; 
ηp2 = .10.  
After participants read the affirmations/ corrections, participants’ belief for facts 
increased, and belief for myths decreased, as shown in Figure 1. This belief change was 
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sustained temporarily for both myths and facts, yet after a one-week period belief for myths 
regressed. As post-manipulation belief levels remained below pre-manipulation belief levels, no 
true backfire effect was elicited.2  
A 2 × 2 × 3 within-between ANOVA (with factors type of item, type of explanation, and 
retention interval) was performed on the post-manipulation belief ratings. For this and all further 
statistical analyses, belief ratings and inference scores for myths were reverse-coded. This was to 
simplify the analysis and allow the type of explanation (brief vs. detailed) to register as a main 
effect rather than an interaction. The figures and discussion of the data trends are presented in the 
original untransformed format to facilitate interpretation. 
The analysis revealed three significant main effects. The main effect of type of item 
(myth vs. fact), F(1,90) = 27.57; p < .001; MSE = 1.68; ηp2 = .23, indicated that overall fact 
belief ratings were closer to the ceiling than myth belief ratings were to the floor (Figure 1). The 
main effect of type of explanation (brief vs. detailed), F(1,90) = 15.38; p < .001; MSE = .74; 
ηp2 = .15, indicated that detailed explanations were slightly better at eliciting belief change than 
brief explanations. The main effect of retention interval, F(2,90) = 4.78; p =.011; MSE = 5.40; 
ηp2 = .10, indicated that the extent of belief change differed over time. This was qualified by a 
significant interaction of type of item and retention interval, F(2,90) = 8.65; p < .001; 
MSE = 1.68; ηp2 = .16, indicating that the change in belief over time was different for facts and 
                                                          
2 Nyhan et al. (2014) found that corrective information regarding the flu vaccine reduced 
participants’ intent to vaccinate, but only in participants with high levels of concern about 
vaccine side effects. To address the assumption that backfire effects may only occur when 
correcting strong belief in the original misconception, the analysis was replicated using each 
participant’s 30 % most strongly believed myths and 30 % least believed facts. There was no 
backfire effect observed for this subset of materials—i.e. myths that participants correctly 
assumed to be false, and facts that participants correctly assumed to be true. At one week, myth 
belief was not statistically different from pre-manipulation levels, p > .05. 
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myths, with fact belief remaining stable across intervals and myth belief rebounding over 
time(all other effects, F < 1). 
Next, we ran a 2 × 2 × 2 within-between ANOVA (factors type of item, type of 
explanation, and retention interval) restricted to the 30-minute and one-week retention intervals 
to clarify specifically whether the difference between fact and (reverse-coded) myth ratings was 
greater after a week than 30 minutes, or in other words, whether belief change was more stable 
over time for myths versus facts. The interaction between type of item and retention interval was 
significant, F(1,61) = 13.90; p <.001; MSE = 1.89; ηp2 = .19, indicating that belief ratings were 
stable for facts from 30 minutes to one-week, whereas belief ratings for myths increased during 
this time period.  
 Even on an individual level, the items showed a consistent pattern: the retracted myths 
were more likely to show regression towards their pre-manipulation levels, whereas beliefs in 
affirmed fact items were relatively sustained over time. Only one myth item showed a 
numerically larger belief rating  a week after correction compared to pre-manipulation belief 
levels.3   
Inference ratings. Even if participants were successfully discounting misinformation in 
the direct belief ratings, they could still be using misinformation in their reasoning. To address 
this question, we analyzed participants’ mean inference scores. All inference scores were 
significantly correlated at the p < .05 level with the respective belief ratings: myth-brief, r = .80; 
myth-detailed, r = .78; fact-brief, r = .70; and fact-detailed, r = .67. This indicates that inference 
questions supplied a valid indirect measure of belief. 
                                                          
3 This exception was ‘cancer screening is greatly beneficial’ in the brief explanation condition, 
which had a mean pre-manipulation belief rating of 5.04, which rose to 5.33 after one week. 
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A 2 × 2 × 3 within-between ANOVA was performed on the inference scores (with factors 
type of item, type of explanation, and retention interval). The results mimicked the pattern 
obtained with the post-manipulation belief scores, as Figure 2 illustrates. There were main 
effects of type of item, F(1,90) = 6.08; p = .016; MSE = 2.01; ηp2 = .06, and type of explanation, 
F(1,90) = 17.29; p <. 001; MSE = .53; ηp2 = .16, as well as retention interval, F(2,90) = 6.17; 
p = .003; MSE = 3.96; ηp2 = .12. There was an interaction between type of item and retention 
interval, F(2,90) = 3.54; p = .033; MSE = 2.01; ηp2 = .07, indicating that the stability of scores 
across time differed for myths and facts. There was also a marginally significant interaction of 
type of explanation and retention interval, F(2,90) = 2.44; p = .093; MSE = .53; ηp2 = .05, 
suggesting that detailed explanations are particularly beneficial over time (all other effects, 
F < 1.72, p > .19).  
Analogous to the belief ratings analysis, a 2 × 2 × 2 within-between ANOVA (with 
factors type of item, type of explanation, and retention interval) was run testing specifically 
whether inference scores were less stable over time for myths versus facts in the 30-minute to 
one-week interval. The type of item by retention interval interaction was significant, 
F(1,61) = 5.83; p = .019; MSE = 2.24; ηp2 = .09, demonstrating that inference scores increased 
over a one-week period for myths in comparison to facts. 
Returning to the omnibus 2 × 2 × 3 analysis, there was also a marginal interaction 
between type of explanation and retention interval, F(2,90) = 2.44; p = .09; MSE = .53; ηp2 =.05, 
suggesting that inference scores were more stable over time after detailed explanations compared 
to brief explanations. To corroborate this notion, an interaction contrast was run contrasting brief 
against detailed explanations and the pooled immediate and 30-minute intervals against the one-
week interval (assigning lambda weights of 1, -1, 1, -1, to myth-brief, myth-detailed, fact-brief 
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and fact-detailed, and 1, 1, -2 to the immediate, 30-minute, and one-week retention intervals, 
respectively). The contrast was significant, F(1,90) = 4.44; p = .038; MSE = .53, indicating that a 
detailed explanation had its greatest benefit after a long delay. A detailed discussion of the 
Experiment 1 results will be deferred until the Experiment 2 data are presented.  
Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 showed that belief change was more sustained after fact affirmation 
compared to myth retraction. Experiment 2 was a conceptual replication of Experiment 1 but 
tested older adults. As we noted at the outset, it is possible that older adults are more strongly 
susceptible to the effects of familiarity, as older adults have less efficient strategic memory 
processes than young adults, whereas automatic processing is relatively age-invariant (Prull et 
al., 2006). While it is difficult to pinpoint the exact age at which recollection begins to decline, a 
study by Bender, Naveh-Benjamin, and Raz (2010) suggested a marked decline around the age 
of 40, and many studies investigating age-related differences in familiarity and recollection have 
used an older adult population with a mean age in the 60s (e.g. Aizpurua, Garcia-Bajos, & 
Migueles, 2009; Bastin & Van der Linden, 2003) or 70s (Anderson et al, 2008; Fernandes & 
Manios, 2012; Prull et al., 2006). 
Method 
Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1, with two changes: (1) it was conducted with 
an older adult population; (2) an additional three-week retention interval condition was added to 
maximize the chances of eliciting the familiarity backfire effect, given the temporal stability of 
familiarity in contrast to the temporal volatility of recollection.  
CORRECTING INACCURATE INFORMATION  20 
 
 
Participants. Participants were 124 older adults over the age of 50, who volunteered 
after reading an ethically-approved information sheet. Participants were recruited by advertising 
through the University of Western Australia website, Western Australian radio, and flyers around 
Perth. Participants were paid A$15 for their participation. Participants were screened using the 
Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA); thirteen participants were excluded as they scored 
below the normal range of 26 to 30 (Nasreddine et al., 2005). An additional two participants did 
not complete the task. Our final sample thus included N = 109 participants, with 39 males and 70 
females between 50 and 87 years of age (M = 64.37, SD = 8.91). 
Procedure. The procedure replicated Experiment 1, although prior to the study 
participants received the MoCA. One-week and three-week surveys were completed in an online 
format in order to keep participation rates high; two participants in the delayed conditions opted 
to receive paper copies of the survey. These were mailed back to the researchers once they had 
been completed. 
Results 
Belief ratings. A within-subjects ANOVA was performed on the pre-manipulation myth 
and fact belief ratings, which uncovered no significant differences between conditions, 
Mfacts = 6.10, SDfacts = 1.01; Mmyths = 5.92, SDmyths = 1.04. This indicates that prior to reading the 
explanations, participants believed myths and facts equally.  
After participants read the explanations, the belief for facts increased and belief for myths 
declined, as can be seen in Figure 3. In striking similarity to Experiment 1, belief for facts was 
sustained over a one-week period, whereas belief for myths regressed between 30 minutes and 
one-week. Between week 1 and week 3, belief scores for both facts and myths regressed to a 
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similar extent. As post-manipulation myth belief levels remained below pre-manipulation belief 
levels, no true backfire effect was elicited.4  
For all further analyses, belief ratings and inference score ratings for myths were reverse-
coded, as in Experiment 1. A 2 × 2 × 4 within-between ANOVA on belief ratings was run, with 
within-subjects factors type of item (myth vs. fact) and type of explanation (veracity explained 
either briefly or in some detail), and the between-subjects factor retention interval (immediate, 
30-minute, one-week, or three-weeks). The analysis revealed three significant main effects. The 
main effect of type of item (myth vs. fact), F(1,105) = 30.39; p < .001; MSE = 3.04; ηp2 =.0.22, 
indicated that fact ratings were closer to the ceiling than myth ratings were to the floor. The main 
effect of type of explanation (brief vs. detailed), F(1,105) = 14.91; p <.001; MSE = 1.08; 
ηp2  = .12, indicated that detailed explanations were better at eliciting belief change than brief 
explanations, and the main effect of retention interval, F(3,105) = 11.56; p < .001; MSE = 5.36; 
ηp2 = .25, indicated that belief change differed over time. A significant interaction of type of item 
and retention interval, F(3,105) = 4.37; p = .006; MSE = 3.04; ηp2 = .11, indicated that the 
change in belief over time was different for facts and myths, with fact belief remaining largely 
stable across intervals and myth belief increasing over time. The interaction of type of item and 
type of explanation was also significant, F(1,105) = 4.75; p = .031; MSE = 1.11; ηp2 = .04, 
indicating that detailed explanations were slightly more effective for facts than for myths. Lastly, 
the interaction of type of explanation and retention interval indicated that detailed explanations 
promoted belief change better than brief explanations particularly after a long delay, 
                                                          
4 To address the assumption that backfire effects may only occur when correcting strong belief in 
the original misconception, the analysis was replicated using each participants’ 30 % most 
strongly believed myths and 30 % least believed facts. The trend in was replicated, and no 
backfire effect was elicited.  
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F(3,105) = 3.83; p = .012; MSE = 4.11; ηp2 = .10. The remaining interaction of type of item, type 
of explanation, and retention interval remained non-significant, F < 1. 
In subsequent contrast analyses, we focused first on the 30-minute and 1-week retention 
intervals (analogous to Experiment 1). An interaction contrast between type of item (myth vs. 
fact) and retention interval (30-minute vs. one-week) demonstrated that the belief difference 
between myths and facts was greater after one week than 30 minutes, F(1,52) = 8.11; p  = .006; 
MSE = 2.49; ηp2 = .13. Thus, fact belief remained stable over time whereas myth belief increased 
over the period of one week. 
Focusing on retention intervals of 1 and 3 weeks, the analogous type of item by retention 
interval contrast was not significant, p > .05, while a contrast comparing week-1 and week-3 
ratings collapsing all conditions across item and explanation levels was significant, 
F(1,52) = 7.08; p = .010; MSE = 4.79, indicating that from week 1 to week 3, fact and myth 
belief ratings regressed equivalently. In other words, item validity, in general, was being 
forgotten between a one and three-week period. 
As post-manipulation myth belief significantly correlated at the p < .05 level with age for 
both brief retractions, r = .21, and detailed retractions, r = .28, a final set of belief-rating analyses 
looked at age at a finer level of granularity. Specifically, to further address the assumption that 
myth-belief updating deteriorates with age, a median-split analysis comparing participants aged 
50-64 (“middle-aged” participants) with those 65 and older (“old” participants) was conducted 
(see Figure 4). Investigating type of explanation (brief vs. detailed), age (middle-aged vs. old), 
and retention interval (immediate vs. 30-minute vs. one-week), a 2 × 2 × 4 within-between 
ANOVA on myth beliefs was performed. This analysis yielded a main effect of age, 
F(1,101) = 8.73; p  = .004; MSE = 5.29, ηp2 = .08, indicating that old participants were less likely 
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to show sustained myth-belief change than middle-aged participants, and a main effect of 
retention interval F(3,101) = 12.73; p  <.001; MSE = 5.29, ηp2 = .27, indicating that belief 
changed over time (all other effects, F < 2.77, p > .07). Moreover, a 2 × 2 × 2 within-between 
ANOVA (with factors type of explanation, retention interval, and age) focusing on one-week and 
three-week retention intervals revealed a type of explanation by age interaction, F(1,50) = 4.07; 
p = .049; MSE = 1.38; ηp2 = .08, indicating that after longer delays, detailed retractions led to 
more sustained belief change in comparison to brief retractions for middle-aged but not old 
participants.5  
For the sake of completeness, a 2 × 2 × 4 within-between ANOVA on fact beliefs was 
performed (with factors type of item, type of explanation, and retention interval). The analysis 
yielded significant main effects of type of explanation, F(1,101) = 19.20; p  < .001; MSE = 1.03; 
ηp2 = .16, showing that detailed explanations were more effective than brief ones, age, 
F(1,101) = 5.60; p  = .020; MSE = 2.61; ηp2 = .05, indicating that old participants showed less 
belief change than middle-aged participants, and retention interval, F(3,101) = 5.00; p  = .003; 
MSE = 2.61; ηp2 = .13, showing that belief changed over time (all other effects, F < 1.23, p > 
.30). In an analysis confined to the immediate, 30-minute, and one-week conditions, the retention 
                                                          
5 A 2 × 2  × 3  ANOVA also including the young adults from Experiment 1 (with factors type of 
explanation [brief and detailed], retention interval [30 minutes and one-week], and age [young 
adults, middle aged, and old], on post-explanation myth scores likewise revealed a main effect of 
age, F(1,111) = 3.43; p  = .036; MSE = 4.87; ηp2 = .06. An interaction contrast revealed that 
young adults and middle aged participants were equivalently better at reducing their belief in 
misconceptions than older adults, p = .015. Unlike the above analysis, there is no interaction of 
explanation and age—presumably because we could not include the week 3 ratings in the 
analysis—however, a planned comparison contrasting old adults against pooled young and 
middle aged adults, and brief explanations against detailed explanations, approached 
significance, F(1,111) = 3.03; p  = .084; MSE = 1.15. 
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interval effect was non-significant, p > .05, demonstrating that for the duration of one week, fact 
belief was sustained. 
Inference ratings. Returning to the analysis of the full sample, inference scores are 
presented in Figure 5. A 2 × 2 × 4 within-between ANOVA (with factors type of item, type of 
explanation, and retention interval) on the inference scores revealed main effects of type of item, 
F(1,105) = 13.47; p < .001; MSE = 2.00; ηp2 = .11, type of explanation, F(1,105) = 14.89; 
p < .001; MSE = .85; ηp2 = .12, and retention interval, F(3,105) = 6.43; p < .001; MSE = 4.24; 
ηp2 = .16., as well as an interaction between type of item and retention interval, F(3,105) = 3.75; 
p = .013; MSE = 2.00; ηp2 = .10, suggesting that the stability of scores across time differed for 
facts and myths. An interaction contrast, analogous to Experiment 1, testing whether inference 
scores were more stable for facts versus myths in the 30-minute to one-week interval, was 
significant, F(1,52) = 9.01; p = .004; MSE = 1.74; ηp2  = .15. 
There was also an interaction of type of explanation and retention interval 
F(3,105) = 3.38; p = .021; MSE = .85; ηp2  = .09, indicating that inference scores were more 
stable across time after detailed explanations compared to brief explanations. To corroborate this 
notion, an interaction contrast was run contrasting brief against detailed explanations and the 
pooled immediate and 30-minute intervals against the pooled one-week and three-week intervals. 
The contrast was significant, F(1,105) = 10.07; p = .002; MSE = .85, indicating that a detailed 
explanation had its greatest benefit after a long delay (all other effects, F < 1.30, p > .25).  
Discussion 
The present research aimed to determine the parameters of differential forgetting of myth 
and fact veracity over time, in order to clarify if and under what conditions familiarity may 
contribute to false acceptance of corrected myths as true. Dual-process accounts of continued 
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influence effects of misinformation (e.g., Ecker et al., 2010) suggest that post-correction reliance 
on misinformation can be based on automatic memory processes (i.e., myth familiarity) in the 
absence of strategic retrieval and control processes. Hence familiarity-based acceptance of 
corrected falsehoods could be a mechanism underlying continued influence effects of 
misinformation. To investigate this, we presented participants with both myths and facts, 
obtained a pre-manipulation belief rating, then corrected the former and affirmed the latter. We 
manipulated factors known to affect strategic memory processes, thus varying the relative impact 
of familiarity. Specifically, we manipulated the explanations’ level of detail and retention 
interval, and contrasted age groups, and we measured how these factors affected people’s post-
explanation beliefs and inferences. 
While some studies have shown a continued influence effect after a brief retention 
interval (e.g. Ecker et al., 2011; Johnson & Seifert, 1994), our corrections (and affirmations) 
were found to be relatively effective in the short-term. This difference may be due to the fact 
that, unlike the typical continued-influence paradigm, we retracted simple statements rather than 
causal relationships regarding an event, which may be particularly resistant to correction. The 
short-term efficacy of the explanations was more apparent for direct belief ratings (e.g., see 
Figure 1), whereas our inference measure (e.g., see Figure 2) closely resembled the typical result 
pattern found in continued-influence studies, which often also use inference questions to assess 
misinformation effects.  
Differential Forgetting of Myths and Facts Over Time 
Across both experiments, we found a striking asymmetry in that belief change was more 
sustained after fact affirmation compared to myth retraction—retractions thus seemingly have an 
“expiration date”. This asymmetry could be partially explained by familiarity. In the case of an 
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affirmed fact, it does not matter if an individual relies on the recollection of the affirmation or on 
the boosted familiarity of the factual statement—familiarity and recollection operate in unison 
and lead to the individual assuming the item to be true. However, in the case of a retracted myth, 
recollection of the retraction will support the statement’s correct rejection, whereas the myth’s 
boosted familiarity will foster its false acceptance as true, as familiarity and recollection stand in 
opposition (Jacoby, 1991). 
Our inference results mirrored the trend obtained with the belief ratings, demonstrating 
that familiarity effects can extend to inferential reasoning and potentially decision making. It is 
even possible that the act of responding to inference questions can contribute to increased 
familiarity of the misconception, in that the information is subjectively re-experienced during 
memory retrieval following exposure to the inference question, once again leading to a 
potentially increased perception of validity (Ozubko & Fugelsang, 2011). 
Age and Level of Detail 
Overall, the pattern of belief change over time—and in particular the asymmetry between 
facts and myths—was similar in young and older participants. Even young adults’ recollection 
fades over time, leading to an increased reliance upon familiarity in judging the veracity of 
information (Gilbert et al., 1990). However, “old” participants aged 65 and over were found to 
be comparatively worse than those aged 50-64 (“middle-aged” participants) at sustaining their 
post-correction belief that myths are inaccurate. This supports the notion that older adults have 
less efficient strategic memory processes and thus less effective retrieval of the link between an 
item and contextual details (Naveh-Benjamin, 2000; Prull et al., 2006). As the mnemonic link 
between a statement and its veracity is weaker in older adults (Glisky et al., 2001), they seem 
particularly susceptible to the “re-believing” of myths. Although there was also a significant 
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difference in fact belief between the “middle-aged” and “old” groups, this reflected the fact that 
the old participants were less likely to initially update their belief immediately after the 
affirmation. This differed from myth belief where belief change immediately after a correction 
was substantial yet followed by relatively steep forgetting as time progressed. 
Detailed refutations seemed to somewhat mitigate the negative impact of familiarity in 
both younger and middle-aged adults. This is supported by parts of the educational literature, 
which highlight the benefits of detailed refutations (Tippett, 2010). Refutations may encourage 
participants to detect inconsistencies between their own inaccurate beliefs and the corrective 
information, leading to a facilitation of belief change even over long delays (Bedford & J. Cook, 
2013; Guzzetti, 2000; Kowalski & Taylor, 2009). The benefit of directly addressing 
misconceptions could additionally be explained by detailed explanations fostering skepticism 
regarding the initial misinformation or its source (cf. Lewandowsky, Stritzke, Freund, Oberauer, 
& Krueger, 2013; Lewandowsky, Stritzke, Oberauer, & Morales, 2005). However, as much of 
this research stems from the educational literature, it has mostly used undergraduates or school-
age participants (Guzzetti et al., 1993). The current study found that for “old” adults over the age 
of 65, correcting myths using detailed refutations was as ineffective as brief retractions.  
The Familiarity Backfire Effect 
The present research provides evidence for familiarity causing an increase in post-
correction myth belief after a delay; this meshes well with previous studies that similarly 
reported that myths are often “misremembered” as facts over time (Peter & Koch, 2016; Skurnik 
et al., 2005; Skurnik et al., 2007). However, we found no evidence for the existence of a true 
familiarity-based backfire effect. As in these previous studies, the corrections did help 
participants update their beliefs in the right direction—that is, myth beliefs were reduced by the 
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corrections. Corrections repeating the myth were simply less effective (compared to fact 
affirmations) rather than backfiring.  
The lack of a familiarity backfire effect conforms to a range of theoretical proposals 
which suggest that repeating misinformation when correcting could even facilitate belief 
updating. Stadtler, Scharrer, Brummernhenrich, and Bromme (2013) as well as Putnam, 
Wahlheim, and Jacoby (2014) proposed that the detection of conflict—which is arguably made 
more salient through repetition of the misinformation during its retraction—is beneficial for 
updating. Reconsolidation theory likewise argues that reminders of to-be-corrected information 
will labilize its memory representation, thereby facilitating updating (Hardt, Einarsson, & Nader, 
2010). Finally, Kendeou, Walsh, Smith, and O’Brien, (2014) argued that outdated and new 
information must be co-activated for knowledge revision to occur. This is consistent with a study 
by Pashler, Kang, and Mozer (2013), who found that repeating the original misinformation prior 
to learning new information enhanced memory for the new information when tested one week 
later. 
This implies that future research still faces a conundrum: while the present findings 
suggest that false acceptance of corrected myths as true is at least partially driven by familiarity, 
it seems that corrections that do not repeat the myth may be even less effective than corrections 
that do repeat the myth (e.g., Ecker, Hogan, & Lewandowsky, in press; Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 
1988). In other words, if a myth is not repeated when corrected, the associated lack of salience, 
conflict detection, and/or myth/correction co-activation may be even more detrimental to belief 
updating than the boost of the myth’s familiarity. 
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Potential Limitations and Future Directions 
Obtaining belief measures prior to the experimental manipulation could be considered a 
limitation as it may have influenced how the corrective explanations were processed. However, 
in our opinion it is likely that a person’s belief is spontaneously cued when a statement of 
unclear veracity (e.g., a potentially dubious news headline) is encountered, or when a correction 
is presented by itself (e.g., if one is told that listening to Mozart does not increase IQ, it seems 
likely that one would consider whether or not one believes the original claim). Thus, asking for 
an explicit expression of belief prior to a correction will not necessarily have a strong impact on 
how the correction is processed. In our view, from a methodological perspective, the advantages 
of a pretest-posttest design outweigh the disadvantages. “Posttest-only with control” designs as 
used by Skurnik et al. (2005)—where one group received the correction and another group 
received no correction—can be considered quasi-experimental as the treatment and control 
groups cannot be adequately compared at baseline (Morris, 2008). This potentially reduces 
internal validity because the differences at posttest may be artificially inflated (T. D. Cook & 
Campbell, 1979; Morris & DeShon, 2002).  
The artificial nature of the task could be seen as another limitation, as participants 
evaluated a long series of statements. However, people often process a large number of news 
headlines in a short period of time (e.g., when skimming a newspaper or scanning one’s social 
media feed), arguably assessing or at least monitoring the truth/belief status of each. Thus, we 
argue that people routinely deliberate belief prior to correction (i.e., in an experimental context, 
before a post-correction belief rating), even with large numbers of statements. 
We have interpreted our finding that myths are more likely than facts to be 
misremembered after a delay as an effect of familiarity when strategic memory is limited. The 
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present research focused on factors that influence strategic memory processes; future research 
could test the proposed relationship between familiarity and misinformation effects more 
directly, for example by correcting statements that are familiar to some participants but not 
others. Previous research has found that misinformation effects are particularly strong if the 
misinformation is repeatedly presented before a correction (Ecker et al., 2011, also see Weaver, 
Garcia, Schwarz, & Miller, 2007), in line with the familiarity notion. 
Moreover, future research could apply alternative testing procedures to further investigate 
the mechanisms underlying the effects reported here. For example, if myth acceptance is 
familiarity-driven, one might expect corrected myths to be accepted as true particularly in tasks 
requiring true/false categorization of statements (which may be more recognition-based) rather 
than in tasks that have a stronger recall component.  
Practical Applications 
The applied goal of this research was to provide empirically-based advice on how to 
correct misconceptions. The present data suggest the following: First, corrections should include 
details as to why the misinformation is incorrect, as detailed refutations are more effective than 
brief retractions, particularly with younger participants. Thus the misinformation should be 
explicitly retracted and paired with a comprehensive rebuttal.  
Second, even the efficacy of detailed refutations of familiar misconceptions will lessen 
over time, and important corrections may need to be provided repeatedly, despite the potential 
risks of further boosting the myth’s familiarity (also see Ecker et al., 2011a). While this 
recommendation seems somewhat ironic in the context of the boosted-familiarity notion, 
boosting the more volatile recollection of the correction to offset myth familiarity may be 
necessary to achieve enduring belief change.  
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Third, explicitly mentioning a familiar misconception within a retraction will not 
typically backfire in the true sense of the word (this qualifies earlier recommendations; e.g., J. 
Cook & Lewandowsky, 2011; Lewandowsky et al., 2012). Repeating the myth when retracting it 
may be crucial for belief updating because it increases the correction’s salience and fosters 
conflict detection and co-activation of myth and correction (Kendeou et al., 2014; Putnam et al., 
2014; Stadtler et al., 2013). However, given the aforementioned trade-off between the harm from 
boosting myth-familiarity and the benefit from boosting recollection of the correction (e.g. the 
association of the myth and its “negation-tag”), theoretically there may be circumstances where 
the harm outweighs the benefit. Moreover, it may also be problematic to circulate corrections if 
individuals have not previously encountered the relevant misconception, as this may potentially 
make the misinformation familiar to new audiences (Schwarz et al., 2016). It follows that, after 
correcting a myth, the focus should be placed upon factual information as much as possible in 
order to avoid boosting myth familiarity more than necessary (cf. Ecker et al., 2010; Johnson & 
Seifert, 1994; Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Seifert, 2002). 
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Table 1 
Example of a myth and fact, corresponding explanations, and inference questions 
Myth Liars sometimes give themselves away by physical ‘tells’ such 
as looking to the right or not looking you in the eye. 
Brief retraction Liars sometimes give themselves away by physical ‘tells’ such 
as looking to the right or not looking you in the eye. 
MYTH 
Liars do not give themselves away by physical ‘tells’ such as 
looking to the right or not looking you in the eye. 
Detailed refutation Liars sometimes give themselves away by physical ‘tells’ such 
as looking to the right or not looking you in the eye. 
MYTH 
Physical signals which are often assumed to be the ‘tells’ of a 
liar, are in fact signs of emotional discomfort in general. When 
a person is being interviewed or is accused of a crime, a non-liar 
is equally likely to express these signals. A meta-analysis of 
over 100 studies found no consistent physical cues when a 
person was lying. The experimenters stated that “there are no 
behaviors that always occur when people are lying and never 
occur when they are telling the truth”. 
Myth inference question What percentage of lies can FBI detectives catch just by looking 
at physical tells? (0-100%) 
Fact Humans can regrow the tips of fingers and toes after they have 
been amputated. 
Brief affirmation Humans can regrow the tips of fingers and toes after they have 
been amputated. 
FACT 
Humans can regrow the tips of fingers and toes after they have 
been amputated. 
Detailed affirmation Humans can regrow the tips of fingers and toes after they have 
been amputated. 
FACT 
Astonishingly, humans have a very amphibian-like trait of being 
able to regenerate. Unfortunately, this is limited to the very tips 
of our fingers and toes. A study in 1970 found that if the 
individual was under the age of 10, they had a limited capability 
to even regrow bone. There are stem cells at the base of each 
nail, which aid ordinary nail growth as well as the ability to 
rebuild the digit tip after amputation. Interestingly, a 
regenerated finger will sometimes lack a fingerprint. 
Fact inference question What proportion of fingers will regenerate after the tip has been 
amputated? (0-100 %) 
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Figure 1. Post-manipulation belief ratings over time in Experiment 1. Dotted lines indicate the 
pre-manipulation belief ratings’ mean. 
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Figure 2. Post-manipulation inference scores in Experiment 1 over time.  
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Figure 3. Post-manipulation belief ratings in older adults in Experiment 2. Dotted lines indicate 
the pre-manipulation belief ratings’ mean. 
  
CORRECTING INACCURATE INFORMATION  47 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Post-manipulation myth belief ratings presented in an age-based median split in the 
older adult sample.  
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Figure 5. Post-manipulation inference scores in an older adult population in Experiment 2. 
